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From the Legal Literature
Francesca Laguardia*
COVID AND THE CRIMINAL LAW
I.

INTRODUCTION

At the time of this writing, COVID-19 is once again surging across
the United States.1 According to The New York Times COVID Case
Tracker, “[c]ase numbers are spiking across most of the United
States, leading to dire warnings about full hospitals, exhausted
health care workers and potential lockdowns.”2 In response, courts
that had begun trying to resume a normal schedule and in-person
proceedings are returning to the closures and limitations that accompanied the emergency of the spring; 3 and states that had
rejected mask mandates and curfews are reconsidering.4
*Associate Professor, Justice Studies at Montclair State University in New
Jersey. Received J.D. from New York University School of Law, and Ph.D. from
New York University’s Institute for Law and Society.
1

Sarah Almukhtar et al., COVID in the U.S.: Latest Map and Case Count, N.Y.
TIMES, https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2020/us/coronavirus-us-cases.html (last
updated Dec. 20, 2020, 7:56 A.M.); Chris Canipe & Lisa Shumanker, Where U.S.
Coronavirus Cases Are Rising and Falling, REUTERS, https://graphics.reuters.com/HE
ALTH-CORONAVIRUS/USA-TRENDS/dgkvlgkrkpb/index.html (last visited Nov. 18,
2020).
2

Almukhtar et al., supra note 1.

3

E.g., Molly Crane-Newman, NYC Courts Indefinitely Halt Most in-Person
Proceedings After Uptick in Coronavirus Cases, DAILY NEWS (Nov. 13, 2020), https://
www.nydailynews.com/coronavirus/ny-coronavirus-courts-halted-proceedings-indefi
nitely-20201113-punyp25c2nh7jd2iftbdlkie7e-story.html; McKenna Oxenden, Federal
Courts in Maryland Are Closing to the Public Again After a Rise in Coronavirus
Cases, CAP. GAZETTE (Nov. 11, 2020), https://www.capitalgazette.com/coronavirus/bsmd-district-court-closing-20201111-nsdzjsjgfrb7talyawhuqfb4si-story.html.
4

Minyvonne Burke, As Coronavirus Cases Rise, Governors Reverse Course
After Refusing Statewide Mask Mandates, NBC News (Nov. 18, 2020, 12:57 PM),
https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/coronavirus-cases-rise-governors-reversecourse-after-refusing-statewide-mask-n1248124; Noah Higgins-Dunn, Cancel
Thanksgiving, Stay Home, Wear a Mask — State and City Leaders Impose Targeted
Coronavirus Restrictions to Curb COVID without Tanking Economy, CNBC (Nov.
18, 2020, 2:04 PM), cnbc.com/2020/11/18/coronavirus-states-impose-targetedlockdowns-curfews-mask-mandates-ahead-of-thanksgiving.html (“Even Republican
governors, many of whom have long resisted statewide lockdowns and mask
requirements, are now imposing curfews and starting to order residents to wear
face coverings in public.”).
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These responses to COVID-19 have serious repercussions for
criminal law, due process, and criminal procedure.5 Despite the
hopes of the nation, the virus is not under control; it continues to run
rampant and that has serious implications for criminal justice.6
Moreover, it is entirely possible that many of the emergency provisions enacted will last long after the virus is contained.7
The articles explored in this review begin to grapple with these
implications. This review begins with the specific effects of COVID-19
on the courts and jury trials.8 It then moves to the staying power of
these effects.9 Finally, the review looks to the possible Fourth Amendment implications for efforts to enforce COVID-19 responses.10
II. IMPLICATIONS FOR TRIAL RIGHTS
The earliest foray into scholarly exploration of COVID-19
emergency procedures is that of Ryan Shymansky.11 Published in
May of 2020, Shymansky focuses on the effects of court delays and
social distancing on speedy trial rights.12 He stresses that “pretrial
detainees in particular may wallow in prison for indeterminate periods
of time pending trials that may never arrive.”13 This is because federal
district courts have generally determined that continuances are justified in this circumstance.14
He acknowledges that the reasons for these delays are
legitimate. 15 Trials, by necessity, bring witnesses, jurors, and
defendants not only in contact with each other, but also with the
restaurants surrounding the courthouse and all other occupants in
5

Brandon Marc Draper, And Justice for None: How COVID-19 Is Crippling the
Criminal Jury Right, 62 B.C. L. REV. E. SUPP. I.-1 (2020); David Freeman Engstrom,
Post-COVID Courts, 68 UCLA L. REV. DISCOURSE 246 (2020); Henry F. Fradella, Why
the Special Needs Doctrine Is the Most Appropriate Fourth Amendment Theory for
Justifying Police Stops to Enforce COVID-19 Stay-at-Home Orders, 12 CONLAWNOW
1 (2020); Michael Gentithes & Harold Krent, Pandemic Surveillance—The New
Predictive Policing, 12 CONLAWNOW 57 (2020); Ryan Shymansky, Justice Diseased Is
Justice Denied: Coronavirus, Court Closures, and Criminal Trials, 122 W.V. L. REV.
ONLINE 1 (2020).
6

See supra notes 1 & 2.

7

Engstrom, supra note 5, at 248, 251–54; Fradella, supra note 5, at 8;
Gentithes & Krent, supra note 5, at 73.
8

Draper, supra note 5; Shymansky, supra note 5.

9

Engstrom, supra note 5.

10

Fradella, supra note 5; Gentithes & Krent, supra note 5.

11

Shymansky, supra note 5.

12

Shymansky, supra note 5.

13

Shymansky, supra note 5, at 2.

14

Shymansky, supra note 5, at 4, 5–6.

15

Shymansky, supra note 5, at 4.
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the courthouse who those individuals might have avoided
otherwise.16 These increased contacts create a significant risk of
spreading disease.17
Having acknowledged the risk, Shymansky turns to the law. He
begins with a discussion of U.S. Supreme Court doctrine on the
Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial, pointing out that pandemics
were well known at the time of the drafting of the Bill of Rights.18 But
despite this fact, there is little Constitutional doctrine on the right,
and the test for a speedy trial violation relies on an ad hoc analysis
of four broad factors—“length of delay, the reason for the delay, the
defendant’s assertion of his right, and prejudice to the defendant.”19
This lack of guidance spurred Congress to pass the Speedy Trial
Act,20 limiting the time to indictment to within thirty days from arrest,
and limiting trial to within seventy days of indictment or information.21
The Act also offers eight exceptions, most being tailored to specific
circumstances, but also allowing for delay when a judge finds that
the delay serves “the ends of justice” to such a degree that it
outweighs a defendant’s interests in a speedy trial.22 This is a broad
exception, generally allowing for any delay, and has been used to
approve delays of over a year.23
As Shymansky points out, delays related to COVID-19 are likely
to be extensive.24 When Shymansky’s article was published, there
may have been hope for only a brief pause and recovery over the
summer, but it is clear now that the delays are likely to be longterm.25 But while the Speedy Trial Act may allow for such delays,
Shymansky suggests that the Sixth Amendment may be more restrictive as time drags out and alternative solutions (such as mandating
that people wear masks in court or even appear using teleconferencing technology) are more accepted.26 The extent of the delay, and
the likelihood that many defendants will assert their rights and be
16

Shymansky, supra note 5, at 4–5.

17

Shymansky, supra note 5, at 4–5.

18

Shymansky, supra note 5, at 7.

19

Shymansky, supra note 5, at 8 (quoting Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530,
92 S. Ct. 2182, 33 L. Ed. 2d 101 (1972)).
20

Pub. L. No. 93-619, 88 Stat. 2076 (1975) (codified as amended at 18
U.S.C.A. §§ 3161 to 74 (2020)); see also Shymansky, supra note 5, at 9.
21

Shymansky, supra note 5, at 9.

22

Shymansky, supra note 5, at 10.

23

Shymansky, supra note 5, at 10.

24

Shymansky, supra note 5, at 11.

25

See supra notes 1–3 and accompanying text.

26

Shymansky, supra note 5, at 12–13.
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prejudiced by the delay, suggest that significant Sixth Amendment
Speedy Trial claims may arise.27
Yet, Shymansky points out, these “solutions” bring with them their
own problems. As he states,
Attorneys can no more effectively conduct a voir dire examination via
conference call than witnesses can identify evidence via
videoconference. Similarly, jurors cannot be expected to apprehend
evidence published to them in a courtroom as they would evidence
emailed to them during some form of virtual trial.28

Shymansky has no answers to these problems; at the early time
during the pandemic that he wrote his article, he merely describes
the dilemma. Brandon Draper, however, does so when he examines
the right to a jury trial, in all its uniqueness.29
As if writing in response to Shymansky “six months into the
pandemic,” Draper analyzes the solutions courts have found.30 He
focuses on holding trials either in a socially distanced manner or via
videoconference.31 Both, he suggests, pose serious problems for the
jury trial, “the cornerstone of the criminal justice system in the United
States.”32
Draper begins with the problems inherent in socially distanced in
person trials.33 These include the jury’s fear in attending a trial,
where they risk becoming infected, causing fear and anger that may
interfere with thoughtful deliberation.34 He also notes press reports
that, in the pandemic, juries are skewing more heavily toward White
and conservative jurors, undermining the “Sixth Amendment right to
a jury that represents a fair cross-section of his community.”35 Finally,
the requirements of social distance and masks hamper attorneys’
ability to read potential jurors’ reactions to questions in voir dire.36
These problems, Draper suggests, completely destroy courts’ abilities to provide a fair and impartial jury.37
But teleconferenced trials present even more problems to Draper’s
27

Shymansky, supra note 5, at 11–12.

28

Shymansky, supra note 5, at 13.

29

Draper, supra note 5.

30

Draper, supra note 5, at I.-1.

31

Draper, supra note 5, at I.-1, I-3.

32

Draper, supra note 5, at I.-1.

33

Draper, supra note 5, at I.-3–5.

34

Draper, supra note 5, at I.-4.

35

Draper, supra note 5, at I.-4–5.

36

Draper, supra note 5, at I.-5.

37

Draper, supra note 5, at I.-5.
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mind.38 These include privacy and security issues, the psychological
wear on participants, and the tendency of people (jurors) to misread
social cues like facial expressions and emotions when people communicate by video (an obvious problem for the analysis of witness
credibility and character).39 Moreover, federal rules may not even allow for virtual presence in all cases, jurors may be less likely to
focus on the case, and the financial demands of acquiring the best
technology for video trials may exacerbate the disparity in quality of
legal representation between wealthy and indigent defendants.40
Given all these issues, Draper believes many defense attorneys
and prosecutors will come to the conclusion that they cannot obtain
true justice through teleconferenced trials.41 He concludes that
socially distanced, in-person trials are necessary instead, and recommends that judges and defense attorneys warn defendants of the
problems presented, and actively seek to counter them.42
Draper does not acknowledge the possibility (or even likelihood)
that courts will simply postpone trials until the crisis is contained, as
suggested by Shymansky.43 Nor do either Draper or Shymansky
seem to imagine the possibility that these modifications, problematic
as they are, may outlast the virus itself—or at least the associated
crisis. David Freeman Engstrom, however, makes that argument.44
III. IMPLICATIONS FOR THE COURTS AFTER COVID-19
Engstrom sees the COVID-19 crisis not as a self-standing issue,
but as part of a broad range of problems facing the courts and the
country.45 He argues that the pandemic has given the opportunity to
reimagine courts to better serve the interests of the country.46 To that
he begins by offering a different perspective on courts, trials, and
COVID-19. He states:
Even before 2020, America’s justice system was already at a fork in
the road . . . Our courts are chronically underfunded, increasingly
politicized, and behind the curve technologically. They are also shockingly out of touch with the justice needs of ordinary Americans, who
38

Draper, supra note 5, at I.-10.

39

Draper, supra note 5, at I.-6.

40

Draper, supra note 5, at I.-6–8.

41

Draper, supra note 5, at I.-9.

42

Draper, supra note 5, at I.-9–10.

43

Shymansky, supra note 5, at 4, 5–6, 11.

44

Engstrom, supra note 5.

45

Engstrom, supra note 5, at 248.

46

Engstrom, supra note 5, at 246, 248, 264–65.
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get little help in most—perhaps 85 percent or more—of the legal
problems they encounter.”47

In sharp contrast to Draper and Shymansky’s criticism, Engstrom
notes with approval the way courts mobilized to continue necessary
activities such as bail hearings, orders of protection, and child protection hearings.48 To facilitate these activities courts increased reliance
on technology, including parties’ opportunities to file papers electronically or, yes, hold court over Zoom, Skype, or other teleconferencing
platforms. 49 Courts also offered outdoor proceedings, added
plexiglass shields, and found other ways to protect participants.50
But, Engstrom warns, there is no simple return to normal coming
when the crisis ends.51 Instead, court caseloads will rebound with a
fury as a backlog of non-immediate, stayed cases pushes back into
the schedule. 52 Additionally, recessions in general encourage
lawsuits, and bankruptcies, creditor-debtor disputes, divorce
proceedings, child support claims, and domestic violence all may
increase in response.53 COVID-19 has created even worse circumstances than such recessions, and thereby contains “the makings of
a surge that could easily swamp anything we have seen in the past.”54
Importantly, in the face of this soon-to-come tidal wave of cases,
Engstrom warns that “unmet justice problems,”—issues that never
make it into court for a number of reasons—may pose an even
larger problem.55 Engstrom is as interested in increasing the likelihood that these issues are resolved as he is interested in preparing
the courts for the surge.56
To respond to these issues, Engstrom recommends relying on the
new technologies that courts have employed during this crisis.57 He
notes that virtual hearings cut down on staff required, as well as cutting down on attorneys’ travel time, thereby saving money.58 While
he acknowledges the problems for Sixth Amendment trial rights
described by Shymansky and Draper, Engstrom highlights that these
47

Engstrom, supra note 5, at 248.

48

Engstrom, supra note 5, at 250.

49

Engstrom, supra note 5, at 250–51.

50

Engstrom, supra note 5, at 250–51.

51

Engstrom, supra note 5, at 251.

52

Engstrom, supra note 5, at 253.

53

Engstrom, supra note 5, at 252.

54

Engstrom, supra note 5, at 253.

55

Engstrom, supra note 5, at 254.

56

Engstrom, supra note 5, at 264–65.

57

Engstrom, supra note 5, at 255.

58

Engstrom, supra note 5, at 255.
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rights are limited to criminal trials, suppression hearings, and criminal
adjudication—leaving a great deal of criminal and all of civil litigation
open to innovation.59
To Engstrom’s mind, a great deal of the courts’ failure to innovate
in the face of overwhelming caseloads and underwhelming numbers
of cases actually adjudicated can be explained by the legal profession, which has rejected such innovation.60 In this light, the impetus
of COVID-19 may be a boon to civil litigants and victims of crime,
forcing the legal profession to open the doors to innovations that can
make justice more broadly available.61 Engstrom points to restraining
orders and family law as examples of areas where victims and
litigants might be well-served by non-legal expertise and lawyerless
proceedings.62
Most of Engstrom’s analysis concerns civil proceedings, including
the bankruptcies and creditor disputes with which he begins.63 He
discusses the use of artificial intelligence as a way to lessen
demands on attorneys and lessen the need for attorneys at all, to
break the legal monopoly held by attorneys, and leaves criminal
proceedings out of this analysis entirely.64 But given the backlog of
cases suggested by Shymansky’s analysis of speedy trial exceptions,65 one has to wonder whether similar technological innovation
could be used to speed proceedings in the criminal context.
Engstrom also acknowledges Draper’s concerns of disparities in
technology,66 but suggests that this is a reason to act purposefully to
avoid this problem, rather than give up on the possibilities technology offers.67
This warning may be even more appropriate in the context of
search and seizure in relation to COVID-19, discussed below.
IV. ENFORCING COVID-19 RESTRICTIONS
The spread of COVID-19 has led many states to issue mass
mandates and stay at home orders.68 These orders are primarily
enforced through civil penalties, with criminal penalties used “only as
59

Engstrom, supra note 5, at 256.

60

Engstrom, supra note 5, at 257, 259, 265–66.

61

Engstrom, supra note 5, at 257, 260.

62

Engstrom, supra note 5, at 260.

63

Engstrom, supra note 5, at 252.

64

Engstrom, supra note 5, at 2560–64.

65

See supra notes 16–22 and accompanying text.

66

Engstrom, supra note 5, at 263.

67

Engstrom, supra note 5, at 265.

68

See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
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a last resort.”69 But, in the end, if these orders are ignored the are
primarily enforced by law enforcement, i.e. police, and if such
measures as temperature checks or other surveillance is imposed
by the government, it may well implicate Fourth Amendment
concerns even if no criminal prosecution is brought.70 As Henry
Fradella explains, enforcing stay at home orders or isolation may
require police “to stop and question people in ways that would
otherwise be impermissible under the Fourth Amendment—namely
without any individualized suspicion.”71 Further complicating the issue, research on asymptomatic carriers of COVID-19 is inconclusive
but considers the possibility that up to 80% of COVID-19 carriers
may be asymptomatic.72 This could lead to a conclusion that police
might have reason to stop and interrogate anyone at any time.73 Accepting such a framework would pose a risk of becoming a “new
normal,” broadly expanding government power even after the crisis
is past.74 Therefore, Fradella argues, it would be better to limit such
authority by relying on doctrines with a narrower reach.75
One such doctrine, Fradella suggests, would be that of the exigent
circumstances exception to Fourth Amendment requirements.76 But
this exception is particularly narrow, and “courts generally require
police to have probable cause that some underlying criminal activity
is transpiring.”77 The particular harm posed by violations of stay at
home orders is also very speculative, further undermining its
exigency.78 A second exception raised and dismissed by Fradella is
that pertaining to border searches, but it is difficult to apply this
exception to people travelling locally by foot, car, or bicycle.79
Finally, Fradella settles on special needs searches, an exception
that exists specifically to allow police to conduct limited searches in
situations that are outside of “the normal need . . . to detect crime.”80
This exception allows for completely suspicionless searches, in
order to protect public safety, although only when conducted
69

Fradella, supra note 5, at 4.

70

Fradella, supra note 5, at 5; Gentithes & Krent, supra note 5, at 63–73.

71

Fradella, supra note 5, at 6.

72

Fradella, supra note 5, at 7.

73

Fradella, supra note 5, at 8.

74

Fradella, supra note 5, at 8.

75

Fradella, supra note 5, at 8.

76

Fradella, supra note 5, at 8.

77

Fradella, supra note 5, at 9.

78

Fradella, supra note 5, at 10.

79

Fradella, supra note 5, at 10–11.

80

Fradella, supra note 5, at 11.
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reasonably.81 The special needs exception brings an added benefit
of being more clearly limited to the special circumstances that currently exist, and therefore less likely to outlive the pandemic.82
This concern is also reflected in Michael Gentithes and Harold
Krent’s exploration of pandemic surveillance.83 Gentithes and Krent
explore the problem of the transition to a post-pandemic society.84
While they primarily explore the question of using antibody tests to
give more freedom to some individuals than others, their analysis
might also be useful as authorities begin to provide vaccinations. In
this context we still must ask—can rights be limited based on an
analysis of the likelihood that someone might have (and therefore
spread) COVID-19?85 They look to predictive policing as a model by
which to determine if such limitations might violate Fourth and Fifth
Amendment (search and due process) protections.86
Predictive policing is the name for methods by which police may
focus attention on certain crime “hot spots,” or even warn some
individuals that they are under enhanced scrutiny, in order to deter
them from committing crime or warn them that they may be at risk of
victimization.87 To make these predictions police rely on the correlation between past and future crime.88 Gentithes and Krent argue
that, as a strategy of focusing attention and possibly warning certain
individuals, these strategies do not violate the Fourth Amendment;
but they cannot justify a Terry stop and to punish individuals more
harshly based on a failure to heed the warning (and cease criminal
activities) would violate the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause.89
Following this logic, Gentithes and Krent argue that such precautions as temperature scans, which are less invasive than a
breathalyzer, would likely be acceptable.90 Connecting the right to go
to work to such invasions, however, would reach a level of imposition that it would be problematic, particularly given how the high
81

Fradella, supra note 5, at 11–12.

82

Fradella, supra note 5, at 14.

83

Gentithes & Krent, supra note 5.

84

Gentithes & Krent, supra note 5.

85

Gentithes & Krent, supra note 5, at 57.

86

Gentithes & Krent, supra note 5, at 57, 60–61.

87

Gentithes & Krent, supra note 5, at 58–59.

88

Gentithes & Krent, supra note 5, at 59. These correlations, and other crime
correlations, are also used in some bail and parole determinations. Gentithes &
Krent, supra note 5, at 62.
89

Gentithes & Krent, supra note 5, at 60–61.

90

Gentithes & Krent, supra note 5, at 63.
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percentage of inaccurate readings.91 They are similarly accepting of
contact and trace procedures, but only if the data is anonymized and
aggregated to avoid spreading government use of sensitive
information.92 More invasive requirements such as isolation would
likely be justified based on the strong government interests involved
and the accuracy of testing.93
To allow greater freedom to people who have antibodies would
have Fourth Amendment implications due to the invasive nature of a
blood draw, particularly given that there is no suspicion of wrongdoing involved.94 Gentithes and Krent believe that, again, given the
strong government interests most courts would probably allow these
impositions.95 But this would also run a risk creating a new normal,
which could allow such information to be used after the public health
crisis ends.96 To avoid this, Gentithes and Krent recommend requiring that all the acquired information be destroyed once the crisis has
passed.97
As all of these authors suggest, while there are questions of how
far states and the federal government may go in responded to the
threat posed by COVID-19, courts are likely to allow a majority of
the responses.98 Thankfully, however, an end may be in sight.99 The
real question is, how many of these changes will be allowed to
remain. As these authors agree, it would be best for the country to
move carefully in creating exceptions that might quickly become the
norm.
91

Gentithes & Krent, supra note 5, at 65–66.

92

Gentithes & Krent, supra note 5, at 66.

93

Gentithes & Krent, supra note 5, at 67–68.

94

Gentithes & Krent, supra note 5, at 71–72.

95

Gentithes & Krent, supra note 5, at 73.

96

Gentithes & Krent, supra note 5, at 73.

97

Gentithes & Krent, supra note 5, at 73.

98

Draper, supra note 5, at 9–10; Fradella, supra note 5, at 1–4; Gentithes &
Krent, supra note 5, at 65, 72; Shymansky, supra note 5, at 10.
99

Jade Scipioni, Dr. Fauci Says Masks, Social Distancing Will Still Be Needed
After a COVID-19 Vaccine—Here’s Why, CNBC (Nov. 16, 2020, 12:44 PM), https://
www.cnbc.com/2020/11/16/fauci-why-still-need-masks-social-distancing-after-COVI
D-19-vaccine.html (“Fauci predicted to Tapper that most of the country will get vaccinated in the second or third quarter of 2021.”).

© 2021 Thomson Reuters E Criminal Law Bulletin E Vol. 57 No. 2

287

